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Before I begin my prepared remarks, permit me to extend to this
symposium, its organizers, and participants the greetings and grat-
itude of The American Society of International Law. The Society
is giving increased emphasis to wider participation by its member-
ship. Regional meetings and convocations dedicated to the exami-
nation of particular aspects of international law contribute much
to the achievement of this expectation. Consideration of topics
such as those on the agenda of this gathering enrich both interna-
tional relations and law through the interactions of the partici-
pants and the eventual publication of the proceedings. The Ameri-
can Bar Association Committee on Law and National Security, in
conjunction with law schools and student bar and publication
groups, is making a significant contribution to an urgent need for
international order by focusing wider and deeper attention on its
condition, needs, and prospects for revival and further
development.
After I finish what I have to put before you today along subject
matter lines, I have been granted the honor of adding a tribute to
the last speaker in this symposium, although to do so might seem
as much a work of supererogation as to "introduce" him!
There was a time when the affairs and activities of states and
rulers were not the subject of widespread external public evalua-
tion as to their wisdom or propriety. The status of statehood in-
cluded entitlement to what might be called "inviolable national
privacy." State activities, including aspects of foreign policy opera-
tions, were not proper subjects for public comment by representa-
tives of other states. Rather, such comments were confined to con-
fidential diplomatic communications, which often did not become
widely publicized until the historians eventually went to work on
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(by then) old records. The press, the only form of public, communi-
cation then existent, did not often pretend to the rank of a fourth
estate within the field of international relations, and officials of one
state did not customarily comment for publication upon the acts of
other states, even when these were of considerable interest in a for-
eign affairs context.
The evolution of planetary political organization focuses on the
legal restraint of the unbridled volition of states. But progress is
slow, and ebb sometimes cancels flow. The historic freedom of
states to do as they please has on paper-and to a limited, but not
unsure, degree in practice-been diminished, particularly in the
context of resort to armed force in non-defense situations. How-
ever, juridically, states still have a wide range of legal freedom to
engage in activities which have regional or global impact. States
are not responsible to other states for the consequences of such
activities, and they are entitled to reject as intrusive of their "invi-
olable national privacy" any official public criticism or pressure
from other states and, usually, international organizations as well.
However, in modern times unofficial scrutiny and pressure by the
media are well established. Sometimes other states, through cer-
tain of their public attention-seeking instrumentalities, adopt me-
dia techniques themselves.
In the old diplomacy, from the year 1250 to an era that began in
World War I, there were vast differences between official and non-
governmental intrusions into the conduct of a particular state. For
centuries states accepted the convention that, while the foreign
minister of state X might permissibly speak most explicitly to the
foreign minister of state Y about happenings in Y that perturb the
expectations or interests of X, no public utterances of a potentially
coercive nature would occur. Provided the representative of X did
not threaten, criticize, or otherwise diminish Y publicly, Y would
tolerate rather than reject the initiative, and begin to weigh its
own interests in terms of the possibility of an ameliorating re-
sponse. However sharp the private assault, the talks were merely
described as "frank."
But consider what has come to be the diplomatic modality of
today: the press, the electronic media, the self-appointed pundits
of both, scholars, politicians in and out of legislatures, saints and
rascals, all insist upon having "their say" and espousing lines of
action directed toward the recalcitrant state. What one official says
to his opposite number in secret must be formulated with an eye to
the "leak" that is almost sure to follow. Foreign public figures,
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without actual operations authority or responsibility, express their
preferences as to what ought to be done in this or that state. Eval-
uations are often cast in terms of threatened assertion of support
for organized deprivations directed against the government-and
perforce the people-of the target state. One need not extol the old
way or condemn the new. It suffices to note the new limitations
upon traditional diplomacy that the media change has produced.
The rise of the non-state public sector focus on state conduct, like
other historic shifts such as those that eventually undid feudalism
in the West, is apt to achieve a significance that today is not read-
ily or clearly perceived.
In addition to confusing the distinction between official and un-
official sanction systems, the influence of the non-governmental
public sector provides new public, essentially non-statist, bases for
the critical external scrutiny of state conduct. Even authoritarian
and totalitarian states-to bridge for inclusiveness a dubious di-
chotomy of the moment-have not been able to draw about them
the veil of privacy from scrutiny. Thus chiefs of state, heads of
government, coupist juntas, and foreign ministers have come to be
subjected to the long arm of world scrutiny and externally based
pressures with which Elizabeth I, Walsingham, Phillip II, Tal-
leyrand, Napoleon, Alexander I, Metternich, and even Bismarck
did not have to contend. There is no effective immunity today
from non-governmental scrutiny, despite recent efforts at
UNESCO to provide it by provision for exclusive reportorial rights
to chosen instruments of national choice.
Meanwhile, even international institutions that were designed to
permit some departures from the older principle against public ar-
raignment of a state, such as those of the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council, have
been reduced in their effectiveness as impartial, truly international
panels of inquiry by biased misuse of the basic, General Assembly-
linked voting formula, which is itself directly linked to an ancient
political assumption derived from sovereignty that the weight to be
given to the will of any state is legally equal to the weight to be
given to the will of any other state. The emphasis here is that
while non-governmental public intervenors are not limited by ju-
risdictional notions, international organizations are restricted by
their charters as these are "auto-interpreted" from situation to
situation.
While it is sometimes true that universal and regional interna-
tional organizations will exercise their authority to scrutinize, rec-
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ommend, and in some cases even command as to state conduct, the
exercise of these functions seems to be contracting, not expanding.
International civil servants tend to become as discreet as old-fash-
ioned diplomats about publicly criticizing states. Thus, the present
Secretary-General was surprisingly uncharacteristic when he
"spoke out," as the media say, about the decline in effectiveness of
the central purpose of the United Nations system, the control of
armed violence, because of what member states fail to do. Entities
and sub-entities made up of delegates from member states increas-
ingly give evidence that bloc interests, rather than universal inter-
ests, are paramount. World statesmen are rare in the international
arena today.
Even so eminent a structuralist as Professor Louis Sohn will
agree, I feel sure, that the present partial structure of planetary
jurisdiction to curb globally inimical state conduct is sufficiently
flexible to respond, with more effectiveness than it has so far
shown, to the preponderant collective will of states to curb "invio-
lable national privacy" in a significant range of sectors beyond the
use-of-force sector. This seems to be the case particularly as to
matters characterized as being of international economic concern.
As recent events involving the International Monetary Fund attest,
there has been no recession from the post-Bretton Woods precept
that a state cannot effectively claim "to be let alone" as to the
management of its exchange rate, reserves, and foreign debt. Simi-
lar collective manifestations of preponderant group will are only
haltingly evolving as to human rights, especially in the broader
spheres beyond gross brutalization of persons, such as distributive
justice and popular participation in governance.
It is noticed, once one compares what the media say with what
governments officially and publicly say, that equilibrium as to the
shrinkage of "inviolable national privacy" tends to be established
through the expansion of the ambit of collective, preponderant
governmental concern, by the will of states, usually through some
form of international organization. Thus, there is little or no pri-
vacy left as to international economic factors such as trade, bal-
ance of payments, and the like.
Unfortunately, the new unifying (as between non-governmental
and official scrutiny) universalism in the economic sphere has not
been accompanied by advances in the effectiveness of curbs on na-
tional volition with respect to the non-defensive use of force, as
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar has pointed out. The ill-ad-
vised resort by Argentina to military force in the Falklands-
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Malvinas dispute brought about a unilateral response by the
United Kingdom, rather than "take-over" of the situation by the
Security Council as should have occurred if the United Nations
Charter had been followed. It also induced a shocking act of irre-
sponsibility by more than two-thirds of the Western Hemisphere
members of the regional anti-force structure. The response to the
Falklands-Malvinas episode, while not as complete a victory for
volition-curbing as was the action in 1956 involving naked aggres-
sion by the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, was better than
no significant action at all, as in the case of Indian aggression in
Goa and that of Indonesia in South Timor. Nonetheless, alignment
with Britain's extended and uncontrolled "right of self-defense" in
the Falklands by the European Community and eventually by the
United States (departing from its self-appointed shuttle-mediator
role) is a far from satisfactory departure from the existing stan-
dards of the Charter for resolution of use of force situations.
We see from a brief contemplation of some, and recollection of
other, failures that collective denial of "inviolable national pri-
vacy" to uses of force by states is sporadic, uncertain, and largely
ineffective. Unfortunately, in this situation the media is likewise
muted in response, but not for any more serious reason than the
fact that aggression is either not news or does not long remain
news if it continues.
Meanwhile, a further complication results from the fact that eco-
nomic sanctions and denials, originally conceived of in the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations and later included in the United
Nations Charter as coercive instrumentalities of collective will
short of war, have become unilateral tools for the intrusion of one
state into the affairs of another. Often, as in the case of flipping on
and off economic development assistance, the collective well-being
of the people of a state is sacrificed in favor of the foreign percep-
tion of preferences or interests. There have been a number of rela-
tively unsuccessful efforts to influence governments to change their
ways through unilateral economic denials policies. These efforts, on
the whole, are misapplications to inappropriate situations of eco-
nomic warfare strategies that had effectiveness under totally differ-
ent circumstances (total war, highly-industrialized, raw materials-
deficient, sea lanes-vulnerable, or targets of war-mobilized common
purposes between coercing states).
Thus, the present relationship between the national state and
external coercion is a confused one. Obviously, we cannot expect
the state to wither away soon, or perhaps soon enough, but all
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states, not just weaker ones, must be made more amenable to
global and regional majoritarian, preponderant, or prevalent
interests_
We are far from this goal. If we were only realistic and never
idealistic we should all despair. We need to continue to be expec-
tant to a degree that will encourage international influence to
recoup lost ground in the effort to control violence, and to go for-
ward in other sectors using mainly the tools and institutions that
we already have. We must adopt as a goal at least the minimum
planetary interest, survival-survival of the life support system, of
the species, and of persons wherever possible.
"Inviolable national privacy" from official collective scrutiny,
and often control, must shrink, and non-governmental appraisal of
what states and their leaders, and sometimes even their people, do
must continue to be protected against impeding arrangements.
Non-governmental scrutiny should, of course, be responsible and
balanced. Official relations should, on the whole, not imitate or ex-
ploit media attention. Meanwhile, the gap between what is permis-
sibly dealt with in state-to-state relations and the wider area of
what the media can properly deal with should narrow, eventually
to disappear.
I first heard of Dean Rusk from his Boalt Hall classmate, Justice
Frank Newman, when the Justice and I were graduate students to-
gether at Columbia. Frank was impressed, and that impressed me.
Not having served in World War II in the Pacific and Asian thea-
tres, I only heard of, but did not experience, Dean Rusk's effective-
ness in foreign affairs after he came over from the Defense to the
State Department as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
because what little I had to do with Japanese occupation policy
from the Bureau of Economic Affairs never brought me before him
during my civil service days.
After I went to Berkeley myself, I heard a great deal-all very
positive-about Professor Rusk, political scientist at a nearby col-
lege and linked to the Law School. But he became President of the
Rockefeller Foundation before I could meet him on the West
Coast. In time, and against my will, I became chief solicitor for
external support for international studies at Berkeley, and finally,
I was taken upstairs at Rockefeller to talk to the chief.
During the early Kennedy-Johnson years, my very pleasant, very
interesting part-time position as the American member of the In-
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ter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American
States did not involve Secretary of State Rusk. But later, as a field
ambassador and eventually Assistant Secretary, I entered upon
what was for me a period of association with a very great mind and
fine person.
More than once after I had hurtled through the "crash door"
between Assistant Secretary country on the sixth floor and the in-
ner offices of the Secretary on the seventh, I felt confident that we
in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs had every aspect of a for-
eign policy line of action worked out, only to have Secretary Rusk
raise, always with calm courtesy, a question, factor, or analytical
consideration that we had not taken into account. He made me,
without hectoring me, feel like a first year law student again. For
me it was a positive experience.
There are many memories: of grits served at the Secretary's "re-
quest" at working breakfasts with foreign diplomatists (unlike
many Texans, I like grits almost as much as Southerners do); of a
Sunday when Dean and I alone attended to a nasty and unjustified
expulsion of an American ambassador; of magnificent timing of re-
marks at international conferences; of the touches of humor amidst
impressive dignity; of the impact of the sheer quality of the man.
But I did not foresee in those days the Dean Rusk that I now
like best to remember: a tall, smiling, beloved teacher, surrounded
by his exhilirated and admiring students, he as happy as they in
enjoyment of the first moment of victory when it was announced
that the University of Georgia Law School team had won the Jes-
sup International Moot Court competition. Now older myself, even
so, I felt I knew how the students felt about their great teacher, for
in another forum he had been mine!
And now, here today, he will be ours!
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